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CEOs, CFOs, and Accounting Fraud
Implications of Recent Research
By Douglas M. Boyle,
Brian W. Carpenter, and
Dana R. Hermanson

A

ccounting fraud, or fraudulent
financial reporting, has been an ongoing concern for U.S. investors for
several decades, with periodic waves
of accounting fraud cases leading to substantial investor losses and overall reductions
in investor confidence. Research has documented the devastating effects of accounting
fraud cases. For example, Jonathan M.
Karpoff, D. Scott Lee, and Gerald Martin
(“The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books,”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 2008) found that firms committing
fraud are severely punished by the market:
“For each dollar that a firm misleadingly
inflates its market value, on average, it
loses this dollar when its misconduct is
revealed, plus an additional $3.08.” In addition, a recent Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO)–sponsored study, “Fraudulent
Financial Reporting: 1998–2007,” found that
fraud firms were much more likely than similar no-fraud firms to declare bankruptcy,
be involuntarily delisted, or have material
asset sales in the wake of the fraud. Thus,
the consequences to investors of accounting fraud often are quite severe.
Recent research provides important new
insights into the role of CEOs and CFOs
in accounting fraud. In this article, the
authors discuss these findings and offer a
number of implications for directors,
audit committee members, and auditors
seeking to prevent or detect accounting
fraud. The authors conclude by highlighting some useful antifraud resources.

Recent Research Findings
The Exhibit presents information on six
recent studies that examined issues related to
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CEOs, CFOs, and accounting fraud. The
first two studies documented that accounting
fraud is largely driven by the CEO and CFO
(top management). The first study,
“Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998–2007,”
examined 347 alleged accounting fraud cases
investigated by the SEC. The study revealed
that financial statement fraud cases often
involve the top executives, with the CEO or
CFO implicated in 89% of the cases. CEOs
were implicated in 72% of the cases, and
CFOs in 65%. While lower level personnel
often are coerced into carrying out the
mechanics of the fraud scheme, the percentages for CEO and CFO involvement are far

higher than for any other type of employee
in the company (all less than 40%). In a
prior COSO-sponsored study, “Fraudulent
Financial Reporting: 1987–1997,” the CEO
or CFO were named in 83% of the cases;
therefore, CEO/CFO involvement continues
to be found in the vast majority of fraudulent financial reporting cases, and this appears
to be increasing. Given the significant
expenditures of time and money devoted to
reducing fraud in recent years, such results
suggest that fraud prevention and detection
efforts may be performed in a more effective and efficient manner with a more targeted focus on the CEO/CFO.
JANUARY 2012 / THE CPA JOURNAL

The second study, “Report to the
Nations: 2010 Global Fraud Study,” was
based on a global survey administered by
the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners (ACFE) and found a similar
result. The study analyzed more than 1,800
fraud cases (primarily occupational fraud)
that were investigated by certified fraud
examiners. Nearly 14% of the frauds
involving executives or upper management
were fraudulent financial reporting cases,
while less than 5% of the total cases
involved fraudulent financial reporting.
Thus, fraudulent financial reporting cases
were concentrated among executive and
upper-management perpetrators.
Based on these two studies, it is clear
that accounting fraud typically involves
CEOs and CFOs, who may coerce lower
level employees to participate as well.
What is not clear, however, is why some
CEOs and CFOs participate in accounting
fraud. The third study, by Mei Feng, Weili
Ge, Shuqing Luo, and Terry Shevlin, offers
new insights into this issue (“Why Do
CFOs Become Involved in Material
Accounting Manipulations?” Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 2011). First,
the authors found that CEO involvement
in accounting manipulation appears to be
driven by CEOs’ compensation incentives
and facilitated by their power. In other
words, the CEO is involved for personal
gain through equity compensation, and the
CEO’s power (e.g., serving as board chair,
being the company founder, or having
higher pay relative to other executives) is
useful in perpetrating the fraud.
For CFOs, the results are much different. CFOs of companies accused of manipulating their results do not have equity
compensation incentives that are different
from CFOs serving “clean” firms. Thus,
CFOs do not appear to be participating in
accounting schemes for direct personal gain
through equity pay. Rather, the authors
conclude that “CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they
succumb to pressure from CEOs.”
While Feng et al. and others have found
evidence that CEO equity incentives are
associated with accounting manipulations,
it is important to note that the evidence
on this issue is mixed, with various studies in the past decade providing inconsistent results. One recent example of a study
reaching a different conclusion than Feng
JANUARY 2012 / THE CPA JOURNAL

et al. is the fourth study in the Exhibit, by
Chris S. Armstrong, Alan D. Jagolinzer,
and David F. Larcker. Those authors used
a very advanced matching process (ensuring that their sample matched each fraud
company with a similar clean company)
and found no evidence of a link between
accounting fraud and CEO equity incentives. In fact, there was some evidence that
accounting fraud is less likely as CEO equity incentives increase. Thus, recent research
lacks consensus regarding the relationship
between CEO equity incentives and
accounting fraud.
The fifth study in the Exhibit, by Joel
H. Amernic and Russell J. Craig, developed a theoretical argument related to CEO
narcissism and accounting fraud. The
authors stated:
Our central thesis is that accounting
has unique and distinctive features which
plausibly encourage ego-boosting
behaviour by certain, more extreme, narcissistic CEOs. Narcissists possess an
exaggerated sense of self-importance, a
pre-occupation with being the centre of
attention, a lack of compassion for others, a high degree of sensitivity to criticism, and high levels of envy and
arrogance. … It is important for auditors, analysts, regulators and other corporate stakeholders to generally monitor
the language of CEOs for narcissisticlike signs—including such signs provided by financial accounting language
and measures. This importance is
stressed by Amernic and Craig (2007,
p. 27) who contend that CEOs possessing extreme narcissistic-like tendencies
are ‘more prone to “play loose” with the
company’s reported financial position,
to shun remediation strategies and to live
in a fantasy world of delusion about
the company’s financial strength.
(“Accounting as a Facilitator of Extreme
Narcissism,” Journal of Business
Ethics,” 2010, p. 80)
The authors provide a rich discussion of
how CEO narcissism can lead down a path
to materially manipulating the financial
statements to fit the CEO’s inflated view
of himself and the company’s performance.
Finally, Jeffrey R. Cohen, Ganesh
Krishnamoorthy, and Arnold Wright interviewed 30 Big Four audit partners and
managers on a range of corporate governance issues (“Corporate Governance in

the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Period: Auditors’
Experiences,” Contemporary Accounting
Research, 2010). This included two
issues that relate to the present discussion: Who really hires the auditor, and have
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
section 302 certifications by CEOs and
CFOs affected the integrity of financial
reporting? The authors find that auditors
believe, even in the post-SOX period where
the audit committee legally hires the audit
firm, that the CEO and CFO still largely
drive the auditor selection process. (In fact,
one interviewee asserted that CEOs are
even more interested in auditor selection
now than pre-SOX.) Clearly, heavy
involvement by management in the auditor selection process has the potential to
undermine auditor objectivity. With respect
to the SOX section 302 certifications by
CEOs and CFOs (where management personally certifies the financial statements),
most auditors interviewed believe that such
certifications have helped to improve the
integrity of financial reporting post-SOX.
It appears that CEOs and CFOs may feel
more personal accountability due to the
section 302 certifications.
Based on these six studies, the following major themes emerge:
I Accounting fraud is largely driven by
CEOs/CFOs, who may coerce lower level
personnel to participate as well.
I CEOs may engage in accounting fraud
related to equity incentives (although the evidence is mixed), power, and narcissism.
I CFOs appear to engage in accounting
fraud due to pressure exerted by CEOs, rather
than due to their own equity incentives.
I In many companies, CEOs and CFOs
still appear to drive the auditor selection
process, but section 302 certifications by
CEOs and CFOs are perceived to have
improved the integrity of financial reporting post-SOX.

Implications for CPAs
These themes have a number of implications for those focused on preventing or
detecting accounting fraud, especially the
board/audit committee and external auditor, who oversees the CEO/CFO and tests
the financial statements, respectively.
First, it is important for the board, audit
committee, and external auditor to understand the CEO’s personality and level of
power within the organization. CEOs with
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EXHIBIT
Selected Recent Research Related to CEOs, CFOs, and Accounting Fraud
Study

Scope

Selected Findings (Excerpts in Quotes)

Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson,
and Neal, “Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1998–2007,”
COSO (2010)

347 SEC fraud-related enforcement
cases from 1/1/98 to 12/31/07

“In 72 percent of the cases, the AAERs named the CEO, and in 65 percent the
AAERs named the CFO as being associated with the fraud. When considered
together, in 89 percent of the cases, the AAERs named the CEO and/or CFO as
being associated with the financial statement fraud. In COSO’s 1999 study, the
CEO and/or CFO were named in 83 percent of the cases.”

Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners, Report to the Nations:
2010 Global Fraud Study

1,843 fraud cases reported by
certified fraud examiners in a survey;
the respondents were from more
than 100 countries

“Financial statement fraud schemes were also much more common among
executives and upper management.” Financial statement fraud cases
accounted for 13.8% of the 224 executive/upper management cases, versus
only 4.8% of the total cases in the study.

Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin,
“Why Do CFOs Become
Involvedin Material
Accounting Manipulations?”
Journal of Accounting and
Economics (2011)

SEC enforcement cases involving
material accounting manipulations
from mid-1982 to mid-2005 and a
control sample

“We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in
accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the
CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation
firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched
firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that
CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they
succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate
personal financial benefit from their equity incentives.”

Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and
Larcker, “Chief Executive
Officer Equity Incentives and
Accounting Irregularities,”
Journal of Accounting
Research (2010)

Firms with restatements,
accounting-related lawsuits, or
SEC enforcement actions from
2001 to 2005

“This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer … equity-based holdings
and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While
several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical
evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives
and accounting irregularities remains an open question . . . In contrast to most
prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between
CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on
the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we
find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at
firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.”

Amernic and Craig,
“Accounting as a Facilitator
of Extreme Narcissism,”
Journal of Business Ethics
(2010)

Theoretical argument

“We argue that the special features possessed by financial accounting
facilitate extreme narcissism in susceptible CEOs. In particular, we propose
that extremely narcissistic CEOs are key players in a recurring discourse
cycle facilitated by financial accounting language and measures. Such CEOs
project themselves as the corporation they lead, construct a narrative about
the corporation and themselves using financial accounting measures, and
then reflect on how their accounting-constructed performance is perceived
by stakeholders. We do not present empirical evidence about whether the
use of accounting language and measures leads to unethical behaviour
by extreme narcissistic CEOs . . . Rather, we focus on developing alertness
to the potential for accounting, when engaged by an extremely narcissistic
CEO, to be a precursor or implement of unethical behaviour.”

Cohen, Krishnamoorthy,
and Wright, “Corporate
Governance in the PostSarbanes-Oxley Period:
Auditors’ Experiences,”
Contemporary Accounting
Research (2010)

Interviews of 30 Big Four audit
partners and managers

“Auditors were asked to share their experiences on who actually has the
most influence in the appointment and dismissal of auditors in a public
company . . . the mean percentage of actual influence assigned to the
management [CEO, CFO] was 53 percent while that assigned to the audit
committee was 41 percent … One key element of SOX is the certification
of the financial statements by top management (Section 302) … In this study,
approximately 68 percent of the respondents indicated that the requirement
has had a positive impact on the integrity of the financial reports.”

AAERs=Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases; COSO=Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
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tendencies toward narcissism, especially
when combined with a great deal of power,
may be particularly inclined to misstate the
financial results or coerce others to do so.
In addition, while research evidence is
mixed, it is important to consider the
potential for CEO equity incentives to create strong pressure to meet targets, perhaps
through manipulation of the results.
Second, the CFO’s ability to withstand
pressure from the CEO is critical. Research
suggests that CEO pressure is key to
CFO involvement in accounting manipulations. Therefore, it is important for the
board, audit committee, and external
auditor to monitor how the CFO responds
to pressure—does the CFO always stand
her ground, or does the CFO often cave
in to the CEO’s suggestions on accounting
issues?
Third, the CEO’s and CFO’s role in
the auditor selection process should be
monitored. If management dominates this
process, leaving the audit committee in a
ceremonial role, it may be more difficult
for the auditor to be as objective as possible. If auditor objectivity is reduced, it may
be easier for management to successfully
manipulate the results. The audit committee and auditor both need to monitor
management’s role in the auditor selection process and to take their concerns to
the board if management appears to be too
involved in this process.
Finally, how do the CEO and CFO
approach their section 302 certifications?
Is there a meaningful and robust effort to
gain complete comfort with the financial
results, or is the certification viewed as a
“check the box” requirement? Both the
audit committee and the auditor can
attempt to monitor this process.

Additional Resources
The authors encourage interested readers to consult some additional resources that
may be helpful in addressing the accounting fraud problem. First, Jack Dorminey,
Arron Scott Fleming, Mary-Jo Kranacher,
and Richard A. Riley (“Beyond the Fraud
Triangle,” The CPA Journal, July 2010) discuss several existing models of fraud, including the fraud triangle, fraud scale, and fraud
diamond, each of which offers unique
advantages. The authors encourage interested readers to consider a variety of models and tools available in the fraud area. For
JANUARY 2012 / THE CPA JOURNAL

example, in addition to the traditional
focus on incentive, opportunity, and rationalization as ingredients of fraud, the fraud
diamond adds a fourth component, capability. Capability addresses the unique personal characteristics often needed to
exploit a fraud opportunity, such as intelligence, confidence/ego, coercion skills, effective lying, and immunity to stress. (See
David T. Wolfe and Dana R. Hermanson,
“The Fraud Diamond: Considering the Four
Elements of Fraud,” The CPA Journal,
December 2004.)
While many of these traits are desirable in executives, those authors caution
CPAs and others to be alert to the risks
created by these traits. Boards, audit committees, and auditors are encouraged to
consider the capability of top management,
including the potential for top management
to coerce lower level employees into participating in a fraud. It is important to
attempt to assess the level of pressure faced
by lower level employees and for lower
level employees to have a secure method
of communicating their concerns to the
board and audit committee (e.g., when
inappropriate pressure is being exerted by
top management).
Second, the 2008 study, “Managing the
Business Risk of Fraud: A Practical
Guide,” sponsored by the Institute of
Internal Auditors, the ACFE, and the
AICPA, provides a very rich discussion
of antifraud measures. The study develops and discusses five key principles
involved in the fight against fraud:
Principle 1: As part of an organization’s
governance structure, a fraud risk management program should be in place,
including a written policy (or policies) to
convey the expectations of the board of
directors and senior management regarding managing fraud risk.
Principle 2: Fraud risk exposure
should be assessed periodically by the organization to identify specific potential
schemes and events that the organization
needs to mitigate.
Principle 3: Prevention techniques to
avoid potential key fraud risk events should
be established, where feasible, to mitigate
possible impacts on the organization.
Principle 4: Detection techniques should
be established to uncover fraud events
when preventive measures fail or unmitigated risks are realized.

Principle 5: A reporting process
should be in place to solicit input on potential fraud, and a coordinated approach to
investigation and corrective action should
be used to help ensure potential fraud is
addressed appropriately and in a timely
manner.
Finally, in 2010, the Center for Audit
Quality (CAQ) published “Deterring and
Detecting Financial Reporting Fraud,”
aimed squarely at the accounting fraud
problem. The report states:
While there is no “silver bullet,” the
CAQ discussion participants consistently
identified three themes:
 A strong, highly ethical tone at the top
that permeates the corporate culture (an
effective fraud risk management program
is a key component of the tone at the top)
 Skepticism, a questioning mindset that
strengthens professional objectivity, on
the part of all participants in the financial reporting supply chain
 Strong communication among supply
chain participants.
Thus, the CAQ report focuses on tone
at the top, skepticism, and communication as the foundational elements of efforts
to mitigate the accounting fraud problem.
The CAQ report includes a number of
insights in each of these areas. With respect
to tone, the authors believe that the board
and audit committee need to take a lead
role in establishing and monitoring the tone
at the top, for these parties are directly
responsible for overseeing top management. If top management does not share or
act consistent with the board’s and audit
committee’s desired tone, then top management likely needs to be replaced.
Recent research offers new insights
into the role of CEOs and CFOs in
accounting fraud. In the final analysis, the
accounting fraud problem will never disappear, but numerous resources may be
helpful to those seeking to mitigate this
problem, especially board members, audit

committee members, and auditors.
Douglas M. Boyle, CPA, CMA, is an
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Brian W. Carpenter, PhD, is a professor
of accounting, both at the University of
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Hermanson, PhD, is a professor at
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